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We	 compare	 flexible	 low-	carbon	 regulations	 in	 the	
transportation	sector	and	their	interaction	and	sequenc-
ing	 with	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 trading	 systems	 in	
California	and	Quebec.	As	momentum	builds	for	greater	
climate	action,	it	is	necessary	to	better	understand	how	
carbon	 markets	 and	 other	 low-	carbon	 transportation	
policies	 influence	 one	 another.	 First,	 we	 demonstrate	
that	emissions	trading	between	California	and	Quebec	
has	 been	 asymmetric,	 with	 linking	 having	 little	 influ-
ence	on	carbon	prices	from	California's	perspective	but	
leading	to	a	considerable	cost	reduction	from	the	point	








and	 flexible	 transportation	 regulations	 has	 increased	
over	time	in	both	jurisdictions,	the	stringency	of	flexible	
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regulations	 has	 been	 more	 aggressively	 ratcheted	 up	
and	 is	 expected	 to	 continue	 to	 dominate.	 Overall,	 our	
findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 policy	 sequence	 observed	
in	 California	 and	 Quebec	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 po-




questions	 and	 associated	 hypotheses	 emanating	 from	
our	findings,	which	provide	the	basis	for	more	in-	depth	
studies	 involving	 a	 larger	 universe	 of	 cases	 and	 eco-
nomic	sectors.









































have	 they	 been	 deployed	 and	 what	 is	 their	 relationship	 with	 emissions	 trading?	We	 focus	 on	
emissions	trading	as	well	as	one	particularly	important	set	of	low-	carbon	policies—	flexible	low-	
carbon	 regulatory	 instruments	 in	 the	 transportation	 sector.	These	 are	 policy	 instruments	 that	
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a	 gap	 in	 California	 climate	 policy	 literature	 by	 offering	 policy	 details	 on	 its	 relationship	 with	
Quebec,	which	continues	to	be	its	sole	partner	in	emissions	trading.
First,	we	demonstrate	that	emissions	trading	between	California	and	Quebec	has	been	asym-
metric,	with	 linking	having	 little	 influence	on	carbon	prices	 from	California's	perspective	but	
leading	 to	 a	 considerable	 cost	 reduction	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 Quebec,	 which	 has	 fewer	
low-	cost	abatement	opportunities	in	the	energy	sector.	Second,	we	present	evidence	that	Quebec	







F I G U R E  1 	 Three	stages	of	a	stylized	clean	technology	experience	curve.	Source:	Adapted	from	Breetz	et	al.	
(2018)
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The	paper	proceeds	as	follows.	We	first	present	our	theoretical	and	methodological	approach,	
which	 is	 characterized	 by	 its	 focus	 on	 policy	 instruments	 as	 “tools	 of	 government”	 (Hood	 &	












THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Economists	have	 traditionally	advocated	carbon	pricing	as	a	key	 instrument	 for	climate	miti-
gation	(Ecofiscal	Commission,	2019;	High-	Level	Commission	on	Carbon	Prices,	2017;	van	den	
Bergh	 &	 Botzen,	 2020).	 Many	 have	 also	 raised	 concerns	 about	 whether	 and	 how	 low-	carbon	
regulatory	instruments	might	distort	carbon	pricing	and	undermine	its	primary	goals	(Bennear	
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(Klenert	et	al.,	2018;	Rabe,	2018),	which	would	also	suggest	a	role	for	emissions	trading	at	the	
initial	stages	of	the	experience	curve.
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Rabe,	 2018).	 While	 CARB	 has	 broad	 authority	 over	 emissions	 trading	 and	 many	 low-	carbon	
transportation	policy	instruments,	regulation	of	the	energy	sector	is	led	by	the	California	Energy	







ply	 and,	 thus,	 marginal	 emissions	 abatement	 opportunities.	 Quebec's	 energy	 sector	 is	 among	
the	lowest	GHG-	emitting	in	North	America,	with	hydroelectricity	currently	meeting	36%	of	the	













CALIFORNIA AND QUEBEC'S EXPERIENCE WITH 
EMISSIONS TRADING




2012,	after	passage	of	the	2006 California Global Warming Solutions Act	where	the	state	commit-
ted	to	reducing	emissions	to	1990 levels	by	2020	(Assembly	Bill	32,	“AB32”).	While	AB32 set	an	
emission	reduction	target,	it	did	not	set	the	means	of	achieving	it.	Emissions	trading	prevailed	















ministrative	agreement	between	the	two	governments,	the	Agreement on the Harmonization and 






One	 of	 the	 important	 innovations	 of	 the	 California-	Quebec	 carbon	 market	 was	 a	 carbon	
price	floor	and	ceiling.	This	responded	to	concerns	about	price	stability	and	oversupply	that	had	
plagued	the	early	stages	of	the	EU-	ETS	(Ellerman	et	al.,	2010).	In	2013,	California	and	Quebec	



























established	 a	 price	 ceiling,	 though	 its	 form	 has	 changed.	 For	 2013–	2020,	 an	 Allowance	 Price	
Containment	 Reserve	 (APCR),	 administered	 independently	 by	 each	 jurisdiction,	 was	 used	 to	
collect	a	portion	of	allowances	auctioned	each	year,	which	were	set	aside	for	potential	release	
to	 deflate	 a	 sudden	 price	 surge.	 But	 the	 APCR	 might	 be	 depleted	 if	 prices	 reached	 too	 high.	












was	allocated	to	climate	actions	under	the	2013–	2020 Climate Change Action Plan	(MDDELCC,	
2018,	p.	9).	The	Quebec	government's	recently	announced	2030 Plan for a Green Economy	also	
relies	in	an	“important	way”1	on	the	funds	derived	from	the	carbon	market	(Gouvernement	du	
Québec,	2020b,	p.	100).
Significantly,	 the	 Quebec	 emissions	 trading	 system	 preceded	 the	 2016	 introduction	 of	 the	
Canadian	federal	government's	Pan-	Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change	
(Government	of	Canada,	2016).	This	applies	a	carbon	pricing	“backstop”	for	provinces	unwill-











































sions	are	much	greater,	Quebec	will	be	 largely	a	price-	taker	 in	 its	carbon	market	relationship	
with	California.




F I G U R E  2 	 Total	emissions	and	emissions	in	the	road	transport	sector	in	California	and	Quebec,	2000–	2018.	
Source:	CARB	(2020a),	MELCC	(2020b)
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While	 concerns	 about	 miscalibration	 and	 resource	 shuffling	 deserve	 further	 investigation,	
other	 factors	also	contribute	 to	 low	prices—	of	salience	here,	 the	relationship	between	carbon	
pricing	and	flexible	regulations.




F I G U R E  4 	 Expected	carbon	prices	and	benefits	of	emissions	trading	between	California	and	Quebec	over	
the	period	2013–	2020	relative	to	an	unlinked	scenario.	Source:	Adapted	from	Purdon	and	Sinclair-	Desgagné	
(2015,	p.	13)	which	was	based	on	CARB	(2012,	pp.	84–	86,	91–	93)	and	WCI	Economic	Modeling	Team	(2012,	p.	7)



























T A B L E  2 	 Summary	of	allowance	price	probabilities
% Probability price 
at floor





with	complementary	policies 94.3% 1.1% 4.6%
prices	from	$15	(floor)	to	$60	
(ceiling)




with	complementary	policies 46.2% 19.9% 33.9%
2021	prices	from	$18	(floor)	to	$58	
(ceiling)































T A B L E  3 	 Emission	reductions	via	carbon	market	allowance	pricing,	flexible	regulations,	and	other	non-	
price	factors	over	2013–	2020
Source of abatement supply
Average modeled reductions over 2013– 2020
Price floor MtCO2e Price ceiling MtCO2e




Emission reductions resulting from flexible regulations
Vehicle	emission	standards	&	LCFS 77.9 77.9
Renewable	portfolio	standard	&	other	policies 63.1 63.1












COMPARING FLEXIBLE LOW-  CARBON TRANSPORT 
REGULATIONS IN CALIFORNIA AND QUEBEC
Below	we	discuss	the	evolution	of	flexible	regulations	in	the	transportation	sectors	of	California	
and	Quebec,	making	references	 to	US	and	Canadian	 federal	governments	as	appropriate.	We	
organize	 the	 presentation	 of	 these	 results	 according	 to	 vehicle	 fleet	 decarbonization	 (vehicle	
emission	standards	and	ZEV	mandates),	 transport	 fuel	decarbonization	(fuel	carbon	 intensity	
standards)	as	well	as	transportation	demand	management.	See	Table	4	for	a	timeline	of	the	trans-
port	policy	instruments	involved	as	well	as	carbon	pricing.
Vehicle fleet decarbonization: Vehicle emission standards
California	vehicle	emission	standards
California's	early	efforts	 to	address	air	quality	 led	to	 the	development	of	significant	policy	ca-
pacity	 in	 this	 area	 before	 the	 US	 federal	 government,	 which	 granted	 California	 a	 conditional	




The	 low-	emission	 vehicles	 (LEV)	 program	 was	 first	 introduced	 in	 1990	 to	 address	 criteria	
pollutant	exhaust	emissions	(Hanemann,	2007).	By	the	2000s,	California	added	GHG	reductions	





waiver	 for	California—	a	first	 for	 the	EPA—	and	adopted	 less-	rigorous	 federal	standards	under	

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































standards	 of	 California.	 In	 its	 2006	 Climate Change Action Plan,	 the	 Quebec	 government	 an-
nounced	that	it	would	adopt	California's	Pavley	Law	(MDDELCC,	2008,	pp.	25–	26).	In	2009,	the	
Regulation Respecting Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles	was	adopted	by	the	Quebec	
government	and	came	into	force	in	early	2010	(CCA-	Quebec,	2008).	The	Canadian	federal	gov-
ernment	replaced	the	CAFC	in	2010	with	the	Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse 






(MELCC,	 2019).	 Furthermore,	 regulations	 officially	 linking	 Canadian	 federal	 emission	 stan-
dards	to	US	federal	standards	were	introduced	in	2012	for	model	years	2017–	2025	(Posada	et	al.,	
2018).	However,	given	 the	Trump	administration's	 intention	 to	 freeze	vehicle	emission	 levels,	
the	 Canadian	 federal	 government,	 under	 new	 center-	left	 leadership	 following	 2015	 elections,	
delinked	from	US	federal	standards	in	2019	and	aligned	with	California's	vehicle	emission	stan-
dards	(Boyd	&	Rabe,	2019;	Weikle,	2019).
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(CARB,	1998).	 It	also	had	features	 to	provide	flexibility	 to	automobile	makers	 through	a	ZEV	
crediting	system	(CARB,	2018d).	As	observed	by	Stokes	and	Breetz	(2018),	the	initial	California	
ZEV	mandate	proved	too	ambitious	and	had	to	be	expanded	to	include	both	ZEVs	and	partial	
ZEVs	 given	 insufficient	 battery	 technology	 and	 high	 costs.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 initial	 phase	 of	
California's	ZEV	mandate	(1990–	2003)	proved	an	effective	technology	forcing	policy	instrument.	













The	 Quebec	 government	 introduced	 a	 ZEV	 mandate	 in	 2016,	 which	 came	 into	 force	 in	 2018	












Transport fuel decarbonization: Fuel carbon intensity standards
California's	LCFS
An	executive	order	 issued	by	Governor	Schwarzenegger	 in	2007	established	 the	LCFS,	which	
was	first	implemented	in	2011	(Kahn,	2007;	Yeh	et	al.,	2016).	The	standard	operates	by	setting	
a	benchmark	for	carbon	intensity	(CI,	the	amount	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalent	per	megajoule	


































The	 Canadian	 province	 of	 British	 Columbia	 implemented	 a	 LCFS	 shortly	 after	 California,	
sharing	many	properties	of	the	California	policy	but	not	indirect	land	use	change	in	its	lifecycle	
analysis	(Yeh	et	al.,	2016,	p.	229).	The	blueprint	for	Canada's	CFS	likewise	includes	no	indirect	
















Climate policy and regional transportation demand management
Regional	climate	and	transportation	planning	in	California
Here,	we	shift	 from	jurisdiction-	wide	policies	 focused	on	vehicle	 fleet	and	transportation	fuel	
decarbonization	 to	 transportation	 demand	 management	 at	 the	 regional/municipal	 level.	 The 
Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act	of	2008	(Senate	Bill	375,	“SB375”)	is	a	pio-
neering	policy	tool	 that	requires	metropolitan	regions	in	California	to	tackle	regional	vehicle-	
related	 GHG	 emission	 by	 building	 on	 the	 regional	 transportation	 planning	 system	 in	 the	 US	
(Barbour,	2020).
Since	1962,	any	US	metropolitan	area	with	a	population	of	greater	than	50,000 must	create	
a	 metropolitan	 planning	 organization	 (MPO)	 to	 facilitate	 a	 “continuing,	 comprehensive,	 and	



















































known	as	the	Metropolitan Transportation Regional Authority	(ARTM).	The	City	of	Montreal	has	
its	own	public	transportation	service,	but	 its	coordination	with	other	transport	services	 in	the	
larger	metropolitan	area	is	now	governed	by	ARTM.	In	contrast	to	MPOs	in	the	US,	neither	the	





to	public	transit	and	green	infrastructure	through	the	Investing in Canada Plan	 (Infrastucture	
Canada,	2018,	2019b).	The	allocation	of	funds	to	provinces	and	municipalities	for	green	infra-
structure	 is	 undertaken	 through	 the	 Climate Lens	 programme	 (Infrastucture	 Canada,	 2019a),	
requiring	emissions	from	new	federally	funded	infrastructure	projects	be	calculated	using	meth-
odologies	similar	to	offsetting.	The	recent	Canadian	federal	climate	strategy	intends	on	building	




































Political economy of policy sequencing in the transportation sector
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stations	within	the	province	operated	by	a	state-	owned	enterprise	reduces	fuel	costs	for	drivers	in	
Quebec	and	generates	additional	revenue	for	the	province	(Langue	&	Hafsi,	2010).	A	similar	logic	




















sions	 associated	 with	 regional	 transportation	 demand	 through	 SB375	 appear	 to	 be	 facing	 the	
greatest	challenges.	We	submit	that	this	instrument	delivers	the	least	political	economy	benefits	
of	those	considered.	Indeed,	similar	to	carbon	pricing,	SB375	ultimately	aims	to	change	individ-















































Implications for linked emissions trading systems
Our	findings	also	have	implications	for	the	interactions	between	emissions	trading	and	flexible	
























its	 emissions	 domestically	 and	 is	 free-	riding.	 However,	 there	 is	 emerging	 evidence	 that	 many	




































been	 made	 before	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 institutional	 infrastructure	 for	 emissions	 trading	 (Rabe,	









ization	of	 its	 transport	 sector.	The	 flexible	 regulations	 that	Quebec	appears	 to	have	replicated	
from	California	include	its	ZEV	mandate	but	also,	previously,	the	adoption	of	California's	vehicle	
emission	standards	in	2006,	both	of	which	lend	themselves	to	efforts	Quebec	has	been	making	






However,	 California's	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 regional	 transportation	 GHG	 emissions	 through	
a	 flexible	 regional	 planning	 process	 backed	 by	 rigorous	 modeling	 requirements	 has	 no	 direct	
























tial	 increase	 in	 carbon	 pricing.	 The	 question	 would	 be	 whether	 such	 entrepreneurs	 emerged	


















Columbia.	While	Washington	 recently	 adopted	 both	 cap-	and-	trade	 and	 LCFS-	like	 legislation,	
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